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Abstract  
 
In July 2013, a widely celebrated military coup took place in Egypt – only two and a 
half years after the 2011 Revolution. This article investigates the hegemonic power of 
the private press owned by Egypt‟s business elite during the coup period. In the context 
of this research objective, this study answers the question of “how did Egypt‟s private 
press provide popular support to the 2013 military coup?” through following a critical 
approach and conducting framing analysis of news headlines in a period of 112 days. 
This article examines the popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and 
al-Watan as the main case studies. Findings show that Egypt‟s business elite engaged in 
significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup - for the purpose of 
maintaining their hegemonic position in the country. They particularly used the frame 
of “fear” (of the Muslim Brotherhood, potential violence and political chaos) and the 
frame of “promotion” by portraying the military as a saviour.    
 
   
Keywords: Egypt; 2011 Revolution; 2013 Military Coup; Business Elite; Tamarod; Muslim 
Brotherhood           
 
Introduction    
 
We saw millions of people pouring out onto the streets to demand the fall of a regime in 
2011, and we witnessed this seemingly strong regime quickly submitting to the people‟s 
demands only to immediately re-assemble and overthrow an elected government via a 
popularly supported military coup in 2013. How did all this happen? One article is never 
enough to go through a complex discourse of reasons answering this question or drawing a 
full map of mechanisms explaining how the ruling elites outfoxed the masses through 
persuading them to support the opposite of what the same masses sacrificed for two and a 
half years earlier. However, highlighting the role of the business elite‟s private press as a tool 
of the political elite during the military coup period in 2013 can help us understand what was 
happening in Egypt at that moment in contemporary history and how exactly the public chose 
to support a coup. 
Today‟s Egypt has a top-down enforced neoliberal model as many evident realities 
show. This model created notable social injustices and constituted a key reason for the people 
to protest against the ruling elites in 2011. However, the 2011 uprising was not born at that 
moment in history nor did it end with the fall of Mubarak (Abdelrahman 2015). Even though 
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President Mubarak was removed from office, his regime and legacy remained intact. As 
Abdelrahman points out, after the initial euphoria and laudatory comments, the supposedly 
victorious masses were soon relegated to the back seat while established political actors (i.e. 
the military, Muslim Brotherhood and regional powers) returned to centre stage. The 
continuing struggle of millions of Egyptians receive cursory attention and only in so far as 
they are seen to have been subdued and defeated by counter-revolutionary forces 
(Abdelrahman 2015: 3-4). In this context, I believe that mass media – especially the private 
one – overlooks the demands of the masses and sustains Egypt‟s authoritarian regime. As the 
media is still powerful and controlled by the business elite, the masses will keep receiving the 
same cursory attention. 
The media holds an important role in conveying political and economic discourses to 
the public across the whole world. Egypt‟s private media – and those who own it – are in no 
different position. Journalists everywhere have developed countless ways to frame the news. 
The most commonly used themes include emphasizing a conflict, an emotional aspect of a 
story, and grim economic consequences. These frames can promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, or moral evaluation (Entman 1993) and thus influence 
debates and structure political outcomes. Throughout this article, I argue that news 
production is heavily influenced by the political and business interests of private newspapers‟ 
owners (Ratta et al. 2015). Nevertheless, regardless of this influence of news coverage on the 
public, we still have to examine the issue case by case to learn about how this influence 
prevails within certain news agendas. Each case has the potential to teach us how decision-
makers – including members of the business elite in Egypt – formulate their responses to both 
the news agendas they control and the public they target (Benson 2004).  
In their book entitled “Arab Media Moguls”, Naomi Sakr et al. (2015) perceive the 
Middle East as a fertile ground for media moguldom, where a general business tycoon – 
coming from the business elite with associations to the political one – invests in the private 
media. This phenomenon is particularly applicable to the Egyptian case. Autocratic rulers 
impose media regulations and censorship, not to prevent media monopolies but to curb 
political opposition and foster a submissive public. Authoritarian power-holders could live 
with the rise of media tycoons, and media tycoons could co-exist with them (Cook 2006). 
Ownership concentration has spurred the downswing of pluralism in Egyptian media. For 
example, the prominent outspoken journalist Ibrahim Eissa, who founded the al-Tahrir TV 
right after the fall of Mubarak, later sold it to Suleiman Amer, a businessman closely 
connected to Mubarak‟s elite (Hafez 2015). 
In the case of Egyptian and Arab media tycoons, profit-seeking cannot be an overriding 
expectation because distortions in the advertising market and restrictions on editorial content 
severely undermine the commercial potential of media operations. Controlling a network of 
media is an effective way to demonstrate loyalty and thus carry favours with the rulers of a 
country (Skovgaard-Petersen 2015: 273), which is the main goal of the investment. In 
Mubarak‟s era, all the major media tycoons tended to be close to the regime. However, being 
close does not necessarily mean that they approved of the regime or that they actively sought 
its patronage. Rather, it was often an inevitable consequence of the economic importance and 
interests of the business groups they were heading (Guaaybess 2015). In this context, our 
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cases of al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan newspapers provide useful samples to analyse the 
link between politics, business and media in Egypt.  
If we take a look at these two most-circulated private newspapers in Egypt (commonly 
estimated to sell about 150,000 daily copies each, however no reliable sources are available 
for entirely accurate data), we can see that they dominate access to high-profile official 
sources and information. We can also observe the close connections between the newspapers‟ 
editors, investors, and the government. For example, al-Masry al-Youm was founded by 
Salah Diab, who earlier was the founder and main shareholder of Bico that dominates 
agricultural trade in Egypt. He also has had very strong relations with Israeli companies since 
the Camp David Accord was signed in 1978. Al-Watan stands as another example, which was 
founded and board-chaired by Mohamed al-Amin who‟s a top Mubarak supporter and a 
business tycoon with a diverse investments portfolio. Al-Amin interestingly hired Magdy al-
Gallad as al-Watan‟s editor-in-chief. Al-Gallad, known for being highly politically 
connected, is actually a former editor-in-chief of al-Masry al-Youm, which as we just 
mentioned is owned by Diab. 
The Egyptian private media market is clearly dominated by the business elite, which 
largely owns its news outlets and controls them. This control is sustained through being direct 
managers and/or by delegating highly connected editors to serve the investors‟ interests. 
These interests vary between directly economic ones for corporations owned by the same 
investors, the interests of other business groups and indirectly the interests of the political 
elite with its two main factions: the civilian and the military.  
Operating under the shadow of the aforementioned ties between the business and 
political elites within the private press market, Egyptian journalists struggled to incorporate 
the facilitative normative roles in their daily practices after Mubarak‟s fall. However, the 
radical-oppositional role against the Muslim Brotherhood government suited them much 
better, after which most Egyptian journalists re-assumed their traditional collaborative role in 
the service of the ruling (military) elite. The role was understood by these journalists as the 
need to liberate themselves from the dictates of the official discourse as well as from the 
interference of media owners. However again, this was not realistic due to the lack of a 
tradition of investigative reporting, well-founded professional skills, and the presence of a 
legacy of reverential journalism. As such, Egypt‟s private media cannot be evaluated as free 
and independent media (Cammaerts and El-Issawi 2015: 10). Therefore, I choose to situate 
this study under the domain of critical theory, while applying framing analysis of news 
contents produced by the private press during the period around the 2013 military coup. By 
studying the country‟s top two newspapers, al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan as samples, this 
article answers the question of “how did Egypt‟s private press provide popular support to the 
military coup?”.   
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
The instrumental character of media is obvious, not only when one investigates the 
relationships between the owners of the media and the ruling elite but also when one 
considers implications of the published material (Richter and Gräf 2015: 32). As a result, this 
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article adopts a critical approach which occupies a significant space in the history of the 
political economy of communication from a multidisciplinary perspective (Morgan 2013: 
45). Max Horkheimer, one of the founders of critical theory, distinguishes the theory from the 
“traditional” one based on a specific practical purpose: a theory is critical to the extent that it 
seeks human “emancipation from slavery”, acts as a “liberating influence”, and works “to 
create a world which satisfies the needs and powers” of human beings (Bohman 2005). The 
theory is a normative approach based on the judgment that domination is a problem, which is 
an essential theme in this study. The theory applies approaches that place emphasis on the 
unequal distribution of power and criticizes the arrangements whereby such inequalities are 
sustained and reproduced. The concept of reproducing power is also very important to 
understand how the business elite and “Mubarak‟s state” managed to survive the 2011 
Revolution and launch a comeback with the 2013 military coup. The term “critical” is 
usefully broad and encompassing, but it also has distinctive practices and values of critique in 
intellectual enquiry such as questioning, interrogating, and challenging the adequacy of 
explanations of phenomena (Hardy 2014), which are suitable for objectively analysing news 
contents in a country undergoing challenges between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
powers.   
Generally speaking, the vast domain of critical theory stands out with its focus on 
studying a society in terms of how it is influenced by media (Winseck and Yong Jin 2011). A 
critical approach in understanding a political phenomenon would question the media as an 
attack of money and power, and in turn, as a structure that the elites use to dominate a society 
(Habermas 1987: 375). This attacking media is a system that serves for communicating 
messages and symbols to the general populace in a world of concentrated wealth and major 
conflicts of class interests, where fulfilling this role requires systematic propaganda (Herman 
and Chomsky 2002: 1). The “consent” notion in Herman and Chomsky‟s work goes hand in 
hand with Mosco‟s understanding of hegemony, as he argues that hegemony requires the 
exercise of power to maintain consent under changing conditions. Therefore, communication 
plays a central role for the successful maintenance of control and hegemonic consolidation in 
general (Mosco 2009: 209-210). Critical approach has always become popular in times of 
major crises such as the 1968 protests and the global financial meltdown in 2008. As such, it 
should come as no surprise that critical approach will also be used here in this article which 
investigates a military coup supported by mass protests in 2013 – which stands to contradict 
the emancipatory aims of a democratic revolution launched in 2011. 
On 24 July 2013, al-Masry al-Youm published a news item with the headline 
“Tamarod: People‟s Demonstrations on Friday for Mandating the Army to Stop Civil War”. 
Reflecting on this excessively dramatic headline now, one may notice that a civil war did not 
happen after all. It is clear that this headline and many similar ones had sent strong messages 
to the public. Hence, I argue that alongside following a critical approach in understanding the 
hegemony of Egypt‟s private press, framing analysis is the most suitable and complimentary 
approach to apply to this type of content. As we can see in the above headline, the conveyed 
message is very direct and simple, if not blunt.  
Many scholars agree that framing analysis provides a direct and reliable interpretation 
of the role of certain media in shaping ideas and public views about current affairs, and also 
tendencies of responses to covered issues (Norris et al. 2003; D'Angelo and Kuypers 2009). 
New Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (2) 
137 
 
In 1974, Erving Goffman explained that frames are basic mechanisms of understanding what 
is happening in a society and trying to make sense of occurring events. It conceives the media 
as a tool used in forming public opinions and determining individuals‟ trends and ideologies 
(Mattelart and Mattelart 1998). The press particularly plays an effective role in forming 
public opinion, where it has become a social necessity (Gamson 1996). It has also been 
argued that journalists do operate within a set of assumptions or frames, which provide a way 
of organizing and filtering the information that they receive, and in turn they transmit as news 
(Abercrombie and Longhurst 2007: 94). In news framing, a journalist might redesign an 
event in terms of words, meanings and images in order to represent a window for recipients 
to see the world (Tuchman 1978). Or in other words, journalists highlight parts of reality and 
ban or tune down the rest of it, while they are producing what they think is news.  
As explained above, frames constitute “centrally organizing ideas or storylines that 
provide meaning to unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143), thus they 
are also essential for the research question of this study which examines the way in which 
two popular newspapers were “telling the story” of the critical events in 2013. Indeed, the 
frames put forwarded by these newspapers played a crucial role in social mobilization 
(Benford and Snow 1988), as millions marched in support of the 2013 coup.  
 
Methodology  
 
Based on the two chosen theoretical domains mentioned above – critical theory and framing 
analysis – the methodology of this research is designed to conduct critical qualitative analysis 
of Egypt‟s private press, which is controlled by the country‟s business elite. The analysis 
discusses the news content produced around the military coup period in 2013 using empirical 
data produced by framing analysis. The focus of analysis is particularly given to the top two 
private newspapers, al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan.  
The last section of this article, which is mostly dedicated to framing analysis, is a result 
of thorough work done on news contents produced by the two sample newspapers around the 
coup period. For the sake of validity, reliability and introduction to the examined sample of 
articles, it is always suggested that a pilot study is conducted by selecting a sub-sample 
(Wimmer and Dominick 1983), then applying the actual framing analysis of the private press 
(print and online content by the two newspapers) in exactly 112 days around the coup. In this 
period (26 April – 15 August 2013), I applied one extra day concept at the end of it, the 15th 
of August, which is the day following the events known as the Rab‟a incidents, where 
hundreds of participants in a pro-Morsi sit-in were killed and thousands were injured. As for 
the beginning of the same period, I chose the 26th of April as a significant beginning, which 
is the date the Tamarod (Rebel) Campaign was inaugurated in Tahrir Square (the foundation 
and related arguments around Tamarod are thoroughly discussed in the following section). I 
chose 337 headlines by al-Masry al-Youm with the word “Tamarod” found in the 
newspaper‟s online archive and 345 by al-Watan with the same word and same period. 
In this research, I only used the headlines of the news stories as most readers in today‟s 
digitalized news world tend to take their impressions through headlines and share articles on 
the social media without necessarily reading the actual content. The sentiment of the headline 
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is strongly related to the popularity of the news and also with the dynamics of the posted 
comments on that particular news (Reis, et al. 2015). As such, it is more realistic for one 
person to manually analyse almost 700 articles by only using headlines. I did not use software 
for this task as this type of programming is rarely available in Arabic, and it is unfortunately 
possible that the translation of Arabic phrases into English may cause the texts to partially 
lose their native linguistic influence – as translations are never perfect.  
As a first reading, I skimmed through the selected sample of the 682 articles by the two 
newspapers and found that there are two major themes that were highly repetitive in their 
headlines. These themes, i.e. frames, are “fear” and “promotion”. For example, when we look 
at the following headline published by al-Masry al-Youm on 19 June 2013, we can directly 
sense the words “threaten” and “terrorists” in association with Morsi:   
 
Tamarod: Morsi Threatens Egyptians by Terrorists… Thursday, our Surprise 
 
Having a headline like this clearly sends a message of fear to the public. Thus, I gave the 
frame of “fear” one frequency in the examination process. As for the following headline, 
published by al-Watan on 25 June 2013, we can see the use of “20 million”, which is an 
overly exaggerated and never verified number:  
  
Tamarod Announces Signatures Pass 20 Million and Discusses 30 June Scenarios 
with Heikal 
 
Additionally, mentioning “[Mohamed Hassanein] Heikal” in the headline is considered a 
great privilege, as he is one of the top intellectual figures in the Arab World, known for his 
very rare appearances in the media. I consider a headline like this one a “promotion” for 
Tamarod, which is also an indirect promotion for the army, as Heikal himself is also 
historically a supporter of the Egyptian military. Thus, the frame of “promotion” serves as a 
complementary piece to the frame of “fear”, as people would need hope and protection in 
supposedly dangerous/unstable times. Therefore, with the second reading, I give the frame of 
“promotion” one frequency in the examination process. Then the process goes carefully and 
slowly with each headlines of the sample for the sake of estimating the numbers of 
frequencies of each of the two previously suggested frames in order to reach our final results. 
In addition to the empirical data put forward by framing analysis, this article benefits 
from responses by Egyptian senior media professionals interviewed for this research. These 
responses are embedded into arguments and analyses throughout this article whenever 
relevant. These interviews play an additional role because of the special access to information 
each interviewee has, which is not usually available to average journalists. The sources I 
interviewed are all influential media professionals who provide a significant portion of the 
daily news production in Egypt‟s private press market. I interviewed five of these high-
profile sources via email for this study. Four of them are influential journalists and editors, 
and one is the CEO of a private media company. Their ages range between late 30s and late 
40s. Some of them work for the same two sample newspapers studied here. I provided 
relatively little details about them in order to avoid exposing them to security risks. These 
precautions are necessary as they are still living in Egypt. The country is now considered one 
New Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (2) 
139 
 
of the worst jailers of journalists worldwide (CPJ 2015). Therefore, I decided to process their 
interviews anonymously by giving them gender-neutral pseudonyms such as Nour Magdy, 
Alaa Zakareya, Reda Abbas, Wesam Shawkat, and Ihsan Sameer.  
 
The Emergence of Tamarod 
 
“Thank You for Rebelling! The 30 June Revolution Succeeded Thanks to You”. This was the 
only text that could be found on the Tamarod (Rebel) Movement official website 
(tamarod.com) for about a year following the coup of 3 July 2013. No forms, arguments, 
explanations or demands could be found. In fact, the data and information that existed on the 
movement‟s website before the coup were deleted right after the coup succeeded. Now the 
website itself no longer exists and the domain name is currently offered for sale.  
Tamarod was an opposition youth movement founded on 26 April 2013, initially to 
“withdraw confidence” from Mohamed Morsi – the then president who was elected in 2012 – 
and call for early presidential elections. The movement had an original idea of inviting 
ordinary citizens to sign an official document of “no confidence”, aiming to reach a large 
number of signatures. The objective was to gather a number of signatures that would far 
outweigh the total votes Morsi had received in the 2012 presidential elections. The movement 
launched its campaign from Tahrir Square and was planned to end on 30 June, the first 
anniversary of Morsi‟s term. Its co-founder and spokesperson Mahmoud Badr – later a 
military-supported public figure – declared that the movement managed to collect 22 million 
confidence withdrawal signatures, which was around 10 million more than the number of 
votes Morsi received in 2012. Not a single attempt was documented to investigate this figure 
since its official announcement by the movement on 30 June. 
In addition to the expected vocal criticism and hostility against Tamarod by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and their supporters since its launch, it is observed that following the 3 July 
military coup, non-Islamist voices of suspicion and criticism started to be heard across the 
country and the region accusing the movement of being staged and funded in order to 
facilitate the military coup that quickly followed (Abd el-Latif 2015). Later, two of the 
movement‟s founders were selected to join the committee tasked with re-writing the 
constitution, which reinforced the suspicions.  
In a story published by France24 – Arabic Service – on their news portal on 26 June 
2013, four days before the big day, reporter Houssein Emara copied the following passage 
from the movement‟s Facebook page (which no longer exists): 
 
We [the Egyptian people] are obliged to rebel given the country‟s deterioration 
economically and politically following the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood Group to 
the country‟s rule with their president, Mohamed Morsi, who disturbed all balances of 
justice and completely ignored the revolution and the Egyptian people‟s will, as if the 
revolution did not happen. The picture is now clear to the whole world that the Egyptian 
regime had moved from a gang [Mubarak‟s] to another, and that the revolution failed to 
achieve its goals and failed to fulfil the dreams of those who sacrificed for it in order to 
have a home that enjoys national independence, freedom and social justice after it has 
become controlled by traitors and they still do. 
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Like their website, the above Facebook page no longer exists. While many Tamarod pages 
have mushroomed over the internet, none of which has this specific passage. However, it is 
easy to find this exact text on other websites through a Google search as archive or history. It 
can be that the movement had to remove such idealist and democracy promoting campaign 
from their website and Facebook page(s). After all, what happened merely three days after 30 
June was the exact opposite of what they called for or promised to achieve.   
During his tenure, President Morsi took several actions (like his supra-constitutional 
declaration in November 2012 that he quickly withdrew) that fuelled the discontent against 
him and his group. Such actions made him a very easy target for most political groups, 
revolutionary and anti-revolutionary, except for a few sympathetic Islamist ones. The Salafist 
al-Nour Party was strongly in support of Tamarod. Later the party‟s position against the 
Muslim Brotherhood became clear as they allied with the army, supported the coup and 
provided it with religious legitimacy. 
Ahmed Abdo, one of Tamarod‟s leading co-founders told France24: “The movement 
will head to the High Constitutional Court in order to submit those signatures, demand it to 
withdraw confidence from President Mohamed Morsi, and announce running early 
presidential elections”. He also added that according to Article One in the Egyptian 
Constitution [ironically written a few months earlier by a committee largely dominated by the 
Muslim Brotherhood], “The people are the source of authority” (Emara 2013). Abdo 
explained that the movement had a large legal team that included Khalid Ali – former 
presidential candidate with a revolutionary background – and headed by the President of 
Lawyers‟ Syndicate, Sameh Ashour, in order to observe all legal procedures of the campaign 
and guarantee smoothly dealing with the High Constitutional Court and “examining 
signatures‟ authenticity”, as mentioned in Emara‟s article. However, this supposed plan – that 
was promoted before 30 June – has never been implemented or even mentioned since the 
coup. This issue puts the legitimacy of Tamarod and that of the announcement of having 
collected 22 million signatures in serious question.  
Looking collectively at the interviewees‟ opinions on the issue of Tamarad altogether, 
they seem to have variations in their judgement on the movement‟s relations with the army. 
One way or another, they seem to have a consensus in terms of noting a certain connection 
between Tamarod and the military. However, they differ in expressing or assuming how this 
connection is like or when exactly it started. Ihsan Sameer offers the extreme assumption that 
the Tamarod movement was totally controlled from the beginning: “I believe that it was 
highly supported financially and organizationally by factions of the deep state: police, 
intelligence, businessmen and media”.   
I would actually argue against the scenario of the full military control over Tamarod 
since the beginning of their campaign and lean towards seeing Tamarod as a movement that 
was somehow assumed by the military (and the elites) following its success in creating 
popularity among the public. Not unlike my understanding, Alaa Zakareya and Reda Abbas 
were also very clear in their responses by refusing the scenario that Tamarod was controlled 
by the military from the beginning, and that they believe that it fall under control later. In 
support of this point of view, there are a few news stories that were published mainly during 
May or early June 2013, approximately within the first month following the movement‟s 
birth:   
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Cairo University Students Remember the Revolution’s Martyrs and the Security 
Arrests Tamarod Members 
 
Two Tamarod Members Detained for Four Days for Assaulting 8 Policemen in 
Sadat Metro Stop 
 
Tamarod is Offered to Meet with Interior Minister and Responds: We Won’t Sit 
with a “Murderer” 
 
The above three news stories were consequently published by al-Watan on 12 May, al-Masry 
al-Youm on 22 May, and by al-Watan again on 6 June. I argue that coordination between 
Tamarod and the military started at some point right after the first week of June, three weeks 
before the 30 June mass protests occurred. Here we have to remember that the Ministry of 
Interior was controlled by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), since Mubarak‟s 
fall, and they openly and directly appointed several interior ministers one after the other. 
Therefore, having Tamarod members targeted by the police and refusing to sit with the then 
Minister of Interior (Mohamed Ibrahim, who later fully supported the movement) are all 
signs that the military – at least not until the end of the first week of June 2013 – did not 
communicate or directly coordinate with Tamarod. Hence, the control of, or at least the 
coordination with, the movement did happen from the beginning. Nour Magdy also does not 
think it was controlled from the beginning: “I am not sure of that. Some rumours say that it 
was pure revolutionary movement then some security body used it to topple Morsi. Others 
say that it was totally controlled by the military since the beginning. In all cases, it was used 
by the military to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood, and at least that is how I see it”.  
 
112 Days of Frames 
 
In order to trace the evolving relationship between the private press and Tamarod, in this 
article, I analyse articles‟ headlines by al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan in the period from 26 
April 2013 (Tamarod‟s launch in Tahrir Square) until 15 August the same year (the day 
following the Rab‟a incidents). As explained in the methodology section, I chose 337 news 
stories by al-Masry al-Youm with the word “Tamarod” found in the newspaper‟s online 
archive and 345 by al-Watan with the same word and same period. I initially applied a first 
reading on these headlines to see what message(s) they might frame to the readers and I 
found that there are two major themes that are highly repetitive. Many of the headlines would 
spread “fear” from the Muslim Brotherhood, violence and/or chaos, while others would 
“promote” Tamarod and/or the army as a saviour or a solution. Here are a few examples: 
 
Tamarod: We Collected 22,134,465 Signatures for Confidence Withdrawal from 
Morsi 
 
Tamarod Distributes Flowers to the Police and Army in Sharm al-Sheikh 
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In the first headline above by al-Masry al-Youm, published on 29 June 2013, we can see 
directly a copy of a Tamarod‟s statement without questioning or investigating facts. Even the 
body of this news item did not contain any word or thought of fact-checking or suspicion 
regarding the 22-million figure. This remains a claim that has never been confirmed or 
investigated to this day. Nour Magdy comments on this: “All that I recall is reports on how 
fast it [Tamarod] was spreading, and [on] the number of signatures it was collecting”. This 
headline can be portrayed as a celebration of an early victory ahead of 30 June in promotion 
of the “powerful” Tamarod. In the second headline by al-Masry al-Youm as well, published 
on 4 July 2013, the newspaper did not only promote Tamarod, or the army, they indirectly 
promote the highly demonized police since January 2011 and before. 
 
Islamist-Related Plan for Fighting Tamarod on 30 June 
 
Tamarod: People’s Demonstrations on Friday to Mandate the Army to Stop the 
Civil War 
 
In the first reading of the sample, the fear theme was clearly present, where it appeared that 
the nature of news produced on Tamarod would have high tendency to cause fear among the 
readers by the thoughts of what the Muslim Brotherhood represent as a “violent group”, 
according to the editorial line and what would happen if Tamarod fails in bringing their rule 
down. The above two headlines by al-Masry al-Youm, the first on 9 June and the second on 
24 July, are two examples of many within the 112 days‟ sample that mongers fear among the 
readers from the Muslim Brotherhood. The second headline portrays the army as the only 
solution, otherwise the country supposedly drowns in a civil war. I argue that many of the 
news items produced in this period on Tamarod by al-Masry al-Youm were aimed at making 
the reader feel scared of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists in general (the fear frame) 
and instilling in the reader a hope for the success of Tamarod as a life boat (the promotion 
frame).  
Al-Watan was not so different from al-Masry al-Youm in relation to the position they 
both took towards Tamarod, the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. Regarding the promotion 
frame, al-Watan outweighed al-Masry al-Youm in the polishing process and support they 
both provided to Tamarod. The language and editorial position were more overtly in favour 
of the movement. 
 
Tamarod: New Videogame that Ends with “Game Over, Morsi” 
 
Al Gallad: Tamarod Has Become a Global Model for Peaceful Protesting… Al-
Watan is as Old as the Revolutionary Tide 
 
In the first headline published on 21 June, al-Watan – in its promotion frame campaigning for 
Tamarod – went beyond the idea of mainly positive news. They went for what journalists 
loosely call “sexy news”, something that should attract significant public attention. However, 
the above-mentioned videogame was poorly designed and did not create significant attention 
as a game, in comparison to how the article portrayed it. Al-Watan did not wait to do a proper 
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production of the story and quickly made a big headline out of the game‟s launch. No proper 
information or any quotes were provided from those who might have played it.   
The second headline, published by al-Watan on 3 July, does not need a complex 
analysis or explanation, as no biased news agenda can possibly be more biased than this. The 
chief editor of the newspaper, Magdy al-Gallad, stands next to Tamarod‟s co-founder 
Mahmoud Badr (now sole leader), in the newsroom telling the readers in a televised press 
conference that Tamarod is a “global model”, and that “al-Watan is as old as the revolution”. 
All professional standards and ethics were disregarded by the editor of the newspaper 
himself. 
 
Brotherhood Rehearsal of 30 June: The Group Attacks Tamarod with Arms in 
Alexandria and the People Fight Back, Destroy their Office 
 
Tamarod on the Republican Guards Incident: The Brotherhood Pushing Egypt for 
Civil War 
 
The fear frame in al-Watan‟s headlines was relatively similar to how it was applied in al-
Masry al-Youm, however stronger language was preferred. In the first headline above, 
published on 14 June, al-Watan exaggerated a clash in Alexandria (not officially investigated 
by security) and took a demonizing and overtly anti-Brotherhood position. Details of this 
news story were anecdotal and one-sided at best. As for the second headline, published on 9 
July, again the alleged spectre of the Muslim Brotherhood bringing the country to brink of 
civil war was raised, although Brotherhood members were actually the ones killed by the 
military in that specific incident known as the “Republican Guards‟ incidents”.  
The above first reading of the sample confirmed that the second reading is one with the 
purpose of spotting the two frames of “promotion” and “fear”, whenever found in any of the 
682 headlines of the sample under examination. The following analyses are the results of this 
second reading and examination of frames‟ frequencies: 
Regarding al-Masry al-Youm‟s 337 articles (see Table 1 and Graph 1) on Tamarod 
published during the 112 days in focus, I found that 197 of them (58.46%) promoted 
Tamarod (the promotion frame) and 81 articles (24.03%) aimed to cause fear among the 
public (the fear frame). Regarding al-Watan‟s 345 articles (see Table 2 and Graph 2) on 
Tamarod published in the same period with the same hashtag, I found that 221 of them 
(64.06%) promoted Tamarod (the promotion frame) and 77 articles (22.32%) would cause 
fear among the public (the fear frame).  
 
 
Table 1: The Framing Frequencies of al-Masry al-Youm 
 
No. of 
Articles 
 
Promotion Frame 
 
Percentage 
 
Fear Frame 
 
Percentage 
337 197 58.46% 81 24.03% 
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Graph 1: The Framing Frequencies of al-Masry al-Youm 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Framing Frequencies of al-Watan 
 
No. of 
Articles 
 
Promotion Frame 
 
Percentage 
 
Fear Frame 
 
Percentage 
345 221 64.06% 77 22.32% 
 
Graph 2: The Framing Frequencies of al-Watan  
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For both newspapers‟ 682 examined articles altogether (see Table 3 and Graph 3), I found 
that 418 of them (61.29%) promoted Tamarod (the promotion frame), and that 158 articles 
(23.17%) would cause fear among the public (the fear frame). 
 
Table 3: The Framing Frequencies of al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan Together 
 
No. of 
Articles 
 
Promotion Frame 
 
Percentage 
 
Fear Frame 
 
Percentage 
682 418 61.29% 158 23.17% 
 
 
 
Graph 3: The Framing Frequencies of al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan Together  
 
 
 
 
 
In their news production, al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan seem to have engaged in a 
polishing process of Tamarod and the military, and the demonization of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The two newspapers arguably resembled the PR campaigners for Tamarod, 
however that was clearly not the case in the beginning of the examined period. Nevertheless, 
later the movement and the military appeared in the two newspapers‟ content as the only 
solution out of fear of a “civil war”. Alaa Zakareya says that “Tamarod was grown due to the 
militarization done by the media against the mistakes of the Muslim Brotherhood. Even the 
movement itself held press conferences in the newspapers‟ offices, where al-Watan was 
leading [the trend]”. The notable difference in Zakareya‟s response in comparison to other 
interviewees is that Zakareya added the element of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s political 
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failures as a reason for Tamarod‟s success in addition to the press support the movement 
received. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Taking a critical approach in understanding a political phenomenon by questioning the media 
as an attack of money and power, and in turn, as a structure that the elites use to dominate a 
society (Habermas 1987: 375), this article conducted an analysis of news headlines produced 
by Egypt‟s top two newspapers, al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan, during a critical period of 
112 days covering Tamarod‟s campaign of “confidence withdrawal” from former president 
Mohamed Morsi. As we know now, this process quickly turned into a widely supported 
military coup against an elected government. This article argued that the Tamarod movement 
was not necessarily created by the military, however it was clearly used by them as a façade 
to promote the military among the public through the private press. By doing so, the armed 
forces managed to re-conquer the political space that was earlier given to the Muslim 
Brotherhood following Hosni Mubarak‟s fall under the pressure of the 2011 Revolution. The 
Tamarod campaign paved the way for the return of the military to power, thus ultimately it 
represented a counter-revolutionary power (De Smet 2014). Supported by interviews with 
high profile stakeholders of Egypt‟s media market, this study applied framing analysis as 
empirical investigation in answering the research question of “how did the business elite‟s 
private press support the 2013 military coup?”. Many scholars agree that framing analysis 
provides a direct and reliable interpretation of the role of certain media outlets in shaping 
ideas and public views about current affairs, and also tendencies of responses to covered 
issues (Norris et al. 2003; D‟Angelo and Kuypers 2009). This research concludes that the 
framing of “fear” (of the Muslim Brotherhood) and “promotion” (of the military as a saviour) 
showed that both sample newspapers actively sought to create a basis of popular support for 
the removal of Morsi by the military. This article also concludes that the business elite‟s 
private press had played a pivotal role in reinstating the military on top of the state hierarchy 
through preparing the public to expect and potentially accept the 2013 military coup as 
“legitimate” and “necessary”. 
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